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This paper investigates the impact of institutional 
quality on public investment levels over the period 
1984–2008. Moreover, it studies how the volatility 
of public investment and the quality of infrastructure 
are affected by institutional quality, and explores the 
contribution of other critical factors. The findings suggest 
an inverse relationship between public investment 
levels and institutional quality, supporting the idea 
that governments use public investment as a vehicle 
for rent-seeking or to compensate for the fall in private 
investment due to the poor business environment. In 
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addition, aid flows, revenues and abundance of natural 
resources contribute positively to the level of capital 
spending. The author also finds that high volatility of 
public investment is associated with a lower quality of 
governance. An increase in revenues is associated with a 
reduction in the volatility of capital spending, suggesting 
that proper macroeconomic management smoothes 
the investment cycle. Finally, the paper provides some 
tentative evidence of a positive relationship between 
institutional quality and the quality of infrastructure. 
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1.  Introduction 
During the global financial crisis, many governments employed unprecedented fiscal 
stimulus packages aimed at sustaining employment and spurring economic growth. The ability to 
select appropriate public investment projects and implement them quickly, however, varied 
significantly and in the aftermath of the crisis there have been strong concerns about the 
efficiency of capital spending. Moreover, advanced and emerging economies with large current 
account surpluses are often called to accelerate the global rebalancing by shifting demand from 
foreign to domestic markets. Consequently, public investment has received a lot of attention in 
recent years, as it is commonly seen as a potential tool to narrow imbalances.  
Beyond these growth enhancing and stabilization functions, the role of the public sector 
in closing the massive infrastructure gaps in many developing countries has been widely 
acknowledged. For example, the United Nations Millennium Project (2005) called for a “big 
push” in key infrastructure investment to help countries meet the Millennium Development 
Goals.
2 As a result, there has been a renewed focus to strengthen the public investment 
management (PIM) system in many countries. 
Institutions play a critical role in determining whether public investment spending will 
generate sustainable productive assets, or be inefficient and wasteful. For example, institutional 
mechanisms dictate whether projects undergo a rigorous cost-benefit analysis to evaluate their 
social and economic value, whether they are implemented on time, whether there are legitimate 
procurement practices, whether they adhere to their projected costs, and whether they are 
adequately maintained. In settings with weak institutions, there is a strong risk that public 
investment will be used to serve the ruling elite. Moreover, if politicians seek as many rents as 
are compatible with remaining in power, the amount of rent-seeking should vary in presence of 
partisan and electoral shocks (see Persson and Tabellini, 2000). The latter are likely to be more 
frequent in countries with weak institutional quality (e.g. without strong parties that tie people’s 
electoral preferences), positively affecting the volatility of capital spending.  
This paper expands upon Keefer and Knack’s (2007) cross-country analysis into the 
impact of institutional quality on public investment levels by using a more recent and longer time 
period 1984-2009, and a broader sample within a panel framework. Additionally, it extends their 
research by studying how the volatility of capital spending and the quality of infrastructure are 
affected by institutional quality, and by exploring the contribution of other important factors such 
as conflict, aid, revenues and natural resources.  
Our findings suggest a negative relationship between public investment levels and 
institutional quality. At the same time, aid, revenues and natural resources contribute positively 
to capital spending, even though there are no higher effects in resource rich countries with low 
quality of governance. These results suggest that governments use public investment spending as 
a vehicle for rent-seeking. Alternatively, they could imply that governments might increase 
public investment to compensate for the fall in private investment due to the country’s inability 
to create an attractive business environment.  
We also find that high volatility of public investment is associated with lower quality of 
governance, possibly because of more frequent political shocks. While aid flows and natural 
resource abundance increase the volatility of public investment, growth in revenues is associated 
with its reduction, suggesting a good macroeconomic management that results in a smoother 
investment cycle.  
                                                       
2 More recently, Foster and Briceño-Garmendia (2010) estimate that Africa’s infrastructure needs are around $93 
billion a year. 3 
 
Finally, we provide some tentative evidence of a positive effect from quality of 
governance on the quality of infrastructure. In general, these results cast doubts on the real 
contribution of the government sector to GDP and on the last as a measure of value added. 
Section 2 presents some stylized facts concerning public investment and institutional 
quality. Section 3 summarizes the cross-country empirical literature. Section 4 describes our 
panel dataset, the estimation strategy and the empirical results. Section 5 assesses the policy 
implications of the findings and provides a brief conclusion. 
 
 
2.  Stylized Facts 
Table 1 reports the average levels of public investment over both GDP and total 
investment for each quartile of the distribution for both a quality of governance index and a 
measure of government’s checks and balances.
3 Public investment levels are somewhat stable for 
the first three quartiles of quality of governance, averaging 6.5 percent for public investment as a 
share of GDP and 33.9 percent for the ratio of public investment to total investment. The fourth 
quartile displays much lower values for both ratios, 4.3 percent and 18.7 percent respectively, 
suggesting that countries with the highest quality of governance scores spend less in public 
investment relative to the other countries.  
For checks and balances, the pattern is similar, as the level of public investment over 
GDP (total investment) steadily decreases from an average of 8.2 (38.1) percent of GDP in the 
first quartile to 5.3 (26.6) percent of GDP (total investment) in the fourth quartile. The third 
quartile reports slightly lower values than the fourth one, but this may be also due to the dramatic 
reduction in the number of observations from the second to the last quartile.  
The negative correlation between institutional quality and public investment levels can 
also be observed in the scatter plots in Figure 1, which also show the probability density 
functions for both the institutional quality variables. While quality of governance exhibits a 
Gaussian function, with a thicker right tail (including OECD countries), the figure for checks and 
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Table 2 presents the average volatility of public investment per quartile of quality of 
governance and checks and balances. Both ratios of public investment show a decreasing trend 
as we move from the first to the fourth quartile, suggesting a negative relationship between the 
two variables. On average, countries belonging to the first quartile experience more than twice as 
much volatility in public investment than the countries belonging to the fourth quartile. 
                                                       
3 The observations for quality of governance and checks and balances used for the quartile analysis are the same 
ones employed in the regression analysis of public investments on quality of governance and checks and balances 
only, respectively. 4 
 
Despite the reduction of observations in the last two quartiles of checks and balances, the 
picture is broadly the same. The scatter plots in Figure 2 confirm the negative relationship. 
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Finally, Table 3 shows the averages of infrastructure quality per quartile of quality of 
governance and checks and balances. Three indicators that proxy the quality of infrastructure in 
transport, energy and telecommunications were selected: paved roads as a percentage of total 
roads, electric power system losses as a percentage of total power outputs, and faults per 100 
main fixed lines per year. The latter two indicators were rescaled such that higher values mean 
higher quality.
4 
The quartile analysis reveals that infrastructure quality is positively correlated with 
institutional quality. These findings are true for all the indicators, but the changes from quartile 
to quartile are more dramatic for paved roads as a percentage of total roads. Figure 3 
corroborates these results by displaying the scatter plots with a positively sloped prediction line 
for all combinations of both infrastructure and institutional quality indicators. Interestingly, the 
shape of the probability density functions for the infrastructure quality indicators have significant 
differences. While there are very few observations recording low quality values for the energy 
and telecommunications sectors, the points for the transport sector show much more variance. 
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3.  A Review of the Literature 
Numerous papers have been written about the contribution of public investment to 
economic growth and poverty reduction, but the relationship, though generally positive, has not 
been conclusive.
5 Part of the reason can be attributed to the difficulty in differentiating between 
types of public investment. For example, one would expect the impact to be contingent upon the 
kind of public investment, the amount of investment, the initial stock of public capital, the 
economic context in which investment occurs (Anderson et al., 2006), as well as the quality of 
the investment. 
                                                       
4 Further details about the choice of measures are provided in Section 4. 
5 Comprehensive surveys of the literature can be found in Estache (2006), Romp and de Haan (2007) and Straub 
(2008). A more recent contribution addressing many of the limitations of the previous studies is Calderón and 
Servén (2011). 5 
 
Unlike much of current spending, the budget for public investment spending and the 
selection of projects can be varied with ease, and thus provides more opportunity to be 
influenced by capricious behavior and corrupt politicians and officials (Haque and Kneller, 
2008).  For example, project selection “may be based on who offers the best kickbacks to 
officials, rather than who offers the best price-quality combination, or entire public programs 
may be chosen more for their capacity to generate illegal income than for their potential to 
improve standards of living” (Haque and Kneller, 2008). Therefore, the impact of public 
investment on capital accumulation is often distorted by a high degree of inefficiency, waste, or 
corruption (Dabla-Norris et al., 2011).  
 Rajaram et al. (2010) provide examples of low public investment efficiency: poor project 
selection, including wasteful “white elephant” projects; delays in design and completion of 
projects; corrupt procurement practices; cost over-runs;
6 incomplete projects; and failure to 
operate and maintain assets effectively so that the benefits are less than they should be. A recent 
report by the World Bank (2011) states that corruption in the road sector is a problem for both 
developed and developing countries, yet the economic and social loss is more profound for poor 
communities in developing countries.  A study by the Auditor General of Zambia (Government 
of Zambia, 2010) finds that the use of substandard materials during contract implementation is 
pervasive in the road sector, with every project surveyed having less cement content than 
specified.
7 There is also sufficient evidence to suggest that collusion positively affects tender 
prices for road construction
8 and that the impact in developing countries is significantly greater, 
with estimates above competitive prices of 15 to 60 percent in Tanzania in the 1990s 
(Government of Tanzania, 1996) and 30 percent in Romania (Oxford Business Group, 2004). 
 Measuring the quality of infrastructure stocks, however, is not straightforward. Tanzi 
and Davoodi (1997) use five measures of infrastructure quality: paved roads in good condition as 
a percentage of total paved roads; electric power system losses as a percentage of total power 
output; telecommunication faults per 100 mainlines per year; water losses as a percentage of total 
water provision; and railway diesels in use as a percentage of total diesel inventory. 
Unfortunately, this data is no longer available for a wide range of countries. Calderón and Servén 
(2004), similarly, provide some preliminary evidence on infrastructure quality in Latin America. 
They construct a synthetic measure of infrastructure quality by using three indicators: waiting 
time (in years) for the installation of main telephone lines, the percentage of transmission and 
distribution losses in the production of electricity, and the share of paved roads in total roads. 
The country and temporal coverage for these indicators, however, is limited. 
As an indirect way to measure infrastructure quality, a growing strand of the literature 
has focused on the quality of government institutions. Charkabotry and Dabla-Norris (2009), for 
example, develop a theoretical endogenous growth model to show that development levels, 
corruption, and poor investment quality are often interdependent. Their framework also 
illustrates that weaknesses in the efficiency of public investment reduce productivity, the return 
                                                       
6 For example, Flyvbjerg (2003) finds that there were significant cost overruns, waste, and delays with mega 
infrastructure projects. 
7 Additionally, contracts are affected by the following defects of projects: improperly sized aggregate particles (44 
percent), too much clay (75 percent), aggregates did not meet crushing strength (67 percent), base thinner than 
required (81 percent), surface dressing layers thinner than required (82 percent), concrete samples weaker than 
required (50 percent). 
8 Prices increased by 8 percent in Florida (Gupta, 2001), 15 percent in South Korea (Lee and Hahn, 2002) and as 
high as 20 percent in the Netherlands (Van Den Heuvel, 2006). 6 
 
to private investment, and the degree of specialization, thus decreasing the rate of economic 
growth.  
Public investment in resource-rich settings raises an important set of questions about the 
relationship between observed public expenditure levels and institutional quality. A significant 
strand of the policy advice suggests that oil and gas exporters should translate rents into 
investment for infrastructure. However, there is some evidence that this spending is often poor, 
in part because of the high volatility in resource revenues (Gelb and Grassman, 2010), and that 
institutional indicators for these settings tend to be lower (Leite and Weidmann, 1999). This 
presents a double bind: resource rich-settings have both rents that should be leveraged for greater 
public investment but also potentially relatively weaker institutional settings. 
In the empirical literature, several studies have incorporated measures of corruption and 
institutional quality. Dal Bó and Rossi (2007) use a panel dataset of eighty electricity distribution 
firms from thirteen Latin American countries, and their regression results identify a robust 
negative relationship between corruption and firm efficiency. Haque and Kneller (2008) use a 
three-stage regression to show that corruption increases public investment, but lowers its rate of 
return on economic growth. Delavallade (2006) applies a three-stage least squares analysis to a 
panel of 64 countries from 1996 to 2001, and finds that higher corruption distorts spending away 
from social expenditures (health, education, and social protection) towards other public services, 
order, fuel, and energy. The author argues that social sectors may offer less opportunity for 
embezzlement. Cavallo and Daude (2008) use a system generalized methods of moments 
(GMM) estimator on a panel of 116 developing countries between 1980 and 2006 to test whether 
public investment crowds-out private investment. They find that there is generally a strong 
crowding-out effect, but this effect is reduced in countries with higher scores on the International 
Country Risk Guide (ICRG)’s index of Political Risk.
9   
Another piece of the literature focuses on the institutional context in which public 
investment decisions are undertaken. Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) use a 1980-1995 panel dataset 
and find that higher levels of corruption are associated with higher levels of public investment, 
lower levels of operation and maintenance expenditure, and a lower level of infrastructure 
quality. In the same vein, Keefer and Knack (2007) investigate whether institutional quality is 
associated with higher levels of public investment. Using a 1974-1998 averaged cross-sectional 
dataset and an instrumental variables approach, the authors find that public investment is higher 
in countries with weak governance institutions or more limited checks and balances on 
governments. These results support the argument of Pritchett (2000) that cost and capital value 
of public investment are different concepts and that developing countries have created only little 
useful capital. 
The specific linkage between institutional quality and volatility of capital spending has 
not been studied in the literature. However, Rodrik (2000), Quinn and Wooley (2001), and 
Mobarak (2005) all identify a negative relationship between democracy and volatility of 
economic growth across countries, and Dutt and Mobarak (2007) reveal that democracies are 
characterized by more stable policy choices. The idea is that the dispersion of decision-making 
authority (embedding a system of checks and balances, or veto-players) is a determinant of the 
stability observed in democracies, with respect to both policy and outcomes. The reasons are 
two. First, in a context of checks and balances policymakers need to obtain cooperation and 
approval of others. Second, such dispersion of authority mitigates the information problem, as 
                                                       
9 The Political Risk index includes the following dimensions: government stability, corruption, bureaucracy quality, 
law and order, and political conflict. 7 
 




4.  Empirical Analysis 
The empirical analysis tests the following set of hypotheses: 
(i)  Public investment levels are higher in countries with low institutional quality. 
(ii)  Public investment volatility is higher in countries with low institutional quality. 
(iii)  Infrastructure quality is higher in countries with high institutional quality. 
(iv)  High aid flows, revenues, and natural resources positively affect both the levels 
and volatility of public investment. 
(v)  Public investment levels are higher in resource rich countries with low 
institutional quality. 
(vi)  Corruption is an important channel through which quality of governance affects 
public investment levels (following Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997, and Mauro, 1998). 
 
4.1. Data 
We construct an annual panel dataset for 144 countries over the period 1984-2008 to 
exploit both cross-sectional and time series variation. The dataset encompasses country-level 
public investment and quality of infrastructure data, several measures of institutional quality, and 
a set of control variables (see Table 4). A brief description of the variables used in the analysis is 
provided below, while a more comprehensive list with sources and descriptive statistics is found 
in Table A of the Appendix. 
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Deviating from Keefer and Knack (2007), we use gross public fixed capital formation 
from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook (WEO) database as a measure of public investment. 
Public gross fixed capital formation is referred to the general government sector, excluding 
public corporations.
10  
We normalize public investment by GDP and by total investment.
11 Although some 
countries have missing observations, the majority of countries have the full panel set and this 
ensures that all regions of the world are well represented. 
In order to understand how the variance of public investment is affected by institutional 
quality, we define volatility of public investment as the absolute value of the percentage change 
in the deviation of the ratio of public investment to GDP and total investment,    , from the trend 
component extrapolated using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter
12,      , minus the same deviation 
at time      , normalized by the trend at time      : 
                                                       
10 Keefer and Knack (2007) use the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics (GFS) central government capital 
expenditure data (not including investments by state-owned enterprises). The limited temporal coverage of GFS 
does not permit the authors to take into account the longitudinal dimension, thus they perform an average cross-
sectional analysis over the period 1974-1998. Other data sources include the IMF Article IV country reports, which 
unfortunately are not available on a regular basis. 
11 As a robustness check public investment has also been normalized by general government total expenditure. 
12 For the HP filter the smoothing parameter, λ, has been set to 6.25. 8 
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As observed by Mandelbrot (1963), volatility is likely to show some form of clustering. 
The simple computation of deviations from the trend component of a series in year   could have 
led to biased results if, for example, large changes tend to be followed by large changes of either 
sign. The Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (ARCH) (Engle, 1982) and Generalized 
ARCH (GARCH) (Bollerslev, 1986) models aim to describe more accurately the phenomenon of 
volatility clustering and related effects such as kurtosis. These two widely-used models assume 
that volatility is dependent upon past realizations of the variable in question and related volatility 
process. 
Even though ARCH/GARCH family models are superior tools for modeling volatility, 
the frequency of investment data prevents us from using them. The definition employed in our 
study, however, should account for volatility clustering to some extent, by referring to the local 
trend. Rolling windows of standard deviations are another option, but they imply the loss of 
observations, the introduction of an autoregressive pattern and a reduction of the series variation. 
Thus, they have only been used as a robustness check. 
We follow Calderón and Servén (2004) to identify some measures of infrastructure 
quality. More specifically, we employ paved roads as a percentage of total roads for the quality 
of services in transport and electric power system losses as a percentage of total power outputs 
for quality of services in energy. Instead of using the waiting time for telephone main lines in 
years for telecommunications, we rely on faults per 100 main fixed lines per year.
13 We do not, 
however, construct a synthetic measure of infrastructure quality because principal components 
regression (PCR) suffers from several shortcomings. Hadi and Ling (1998) illustrated that the 
first         principal components can totally fail in accounting for the variation in the response 
variable, which may fit perfectly the last principal component that is always ignored by the 
PCR.
14 Thus, we use the three variables as three different dependent variables. For ease of 
interpretation of the regression results, we rescaled electric power system losses and faults per 
100 main fixed lines so that higher values indicate higher infrastructure.  
In recent years, there has been a proliferation of cross-country governance indicators that 
measure the quality of public financial management (PFM) and PIM systems
15. However, these 
indicators are typically only available for one or very few years, and at most for a limited number 
of countries. Thus, we draw from Keefer and Knack (2007) and construct the quality of 
governance indicator as an additive index of ICRG’s measures. More specifically, we used only 
three of the five underlying variables adopted by the authors, namely corruption, bureaucracy 
quality and law and order tradition of the country, as data on the risk of expropriation and 
repudiation of contracts by government are not available for the period considered. However, as 
                                                       
13 An argument could be made that investment in electricity and communication are also carried out by the private 
sector. However, it could be argued that good institutional quality is likely to be reflected in higher private 
investment levels and better quality. 
14 Hadi and Ling (1998) also argue that using principal components, the increase in the resulting sum of squared 
errors may be grossly discrepant with the magnitudes of the eigenvalues in the principal component decomposition 
of the independent variables’ space. They conclude that there may not be any improvement on numerical accuracy 
via the PCR procedure.  
15 Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) indicators, Quality of Budget Institutions (see Dabla-
Norris et al., 2010), PIM Index (see Dabla-Norris et al., 2011). 9 
 
an alternative measure, we construct the quality of governance wide index, which also includes 
indicators for government stability and democratic accountability. 
Among the ICRG subcomponents, the measure of corruption is defined as actual or 
potential corruption in the form of excessive patronage, nepotism, job reservations, “favor-for-
favors”, secret party funding, and suspiciously close ties between politics and business. 
Moreover, it also considers demands for special payments and bribes connected with import and 
export licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments, police protection, or loans. 
High bureaucracy quality is likely to be positively correlated with less revisions of policy 
when governments change. Therefore, ICRG gives high scores to countries where the 
bureaucracy has the strength and expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy or 
interruptions in government services. These countries are typically characterized by an 
autonomous bureaucracy from political pressure and by established mechanisms for recruitment 
and training.  
ICRG’s indicator of law and order assess each sub-component separately. The law sub-
component is an assessment of the strength and impartiality of the legal system, while the order 
sub-component is an assessment of popular observance of the law.  
 The government stability indicator is an assessment both of the government’s ability to 
carry out its declared programs, and its ability to stay in office. The subcomponents are 
government unity, legislative strength, and popular support. When these score high, the system is 
likely to look orderly and legislation more comprehensive, thus deviations from a disciplined 
behavior should result in a reduction and rules are more binding. 
Finally, institutional quality is also affected by democratic accountability, which 
measures how responsive the government is to its people. Ideally, the less responsive it is, the 
more likely it is that the government will fall; the more responsive it is, the higher the 
satisfaction of the people and the smaller the incentive to deviate from the “good behavior”. 
Therefore, ICRG awards points on the basis of the type of governance enjoyed by the country in 
question (alternating democracy, dominated democracy, de facto one-party state, de jure one-
party state and autarchy). 
The indexes quality of governance and quality of governance wide are scaled from 0 to 
30 and from 0 to 50, respectively, with subcomponents rescaled from 0 to 10. The pair-wise 
correlation coefficient is 94.4 percent. As in Keefer and Knack (2007), the indexes should proxy 
the incentives of governments to seek rents and to prevent the reforms that would limit their 
ability to do so. 
The composed indexes are more instructive than the subcomponents on their own and the 
reasons are multifold. As noted by Keefer and Knack (2007), corruption is not a necessary 
condition for rent-seeking, in fact incentives for politicians to deviate from a disciplined behavior 
may be legal and, at the same time, institutions might reduce rent-seeking even when corruption 
is high for other reasons. Moreover, a strong and impartial legal system that is observed by the 
population does not guarantee absence of rent-seeking behaviors, especially when the law does 
not cover all the potential distorting practices. Similarly, a stable government or a high 
democratic accountability on their own may not be good quality proxies to induce “good 
behavior”. All these considerations make clear that a composite index is superior, however the 
single contribution of each subcomponent is analyzed by running ad hoc regressions. 
North and Weingast (1989) and Acemoglu et al. (2001) argue that incentives to extract 
rents from citizens vary with the presence of political checks and balances and electoral 
competition. More specifically, governments might restrict citizens’ influence on political 10 
 
decisions and careers in order to prevent their access to the sources of rents (e.g. natural 
resources) when political checks and balances are low and electoral competition is absent.  
As in Keefer and Knack (2007) we adopt the measure checks and balances cum elections 
from the Database of Political Institutions (DPI).
16 This measure is a function of the number of 
parties in the government coalition (for parliamentary systems), whether the president's party has 
a majority in the legislature (presidential systems), whether elections are governed by closed-list 
or open-list rules (with the former granting more authority to the heads of parties), and of the 
DPI's legislative index of electoral competitiveness.  
The use of formal checks and balances presents, however, some limitations. Since it is 
only one of many possible political determinants of low institutional quality, the results are 
unlikely to be as strong as for quality of governance. Moreover, this measure draws on a fixed 
view of organization of government and some checks and balances may be hard to observe. 
We would expect both quality of governance and checks and balances to show little 
variation over time and great variation across countries. However, the relatively wide time span 
allows the within standard deviation to be almost half of the across standard deviation (2.6 
against 5.6) for quality of governance
17 and nearly the same for checks and balances (1.3 against 
1.0), justifying the panel analysis. 
A set of other factors is likely to impact the quantity and the volatility of public 
investment. As observed in Knack and Keefer (2007), left-leaning governments might prove 
more prone to intervene in the economy and favoring more redistribution as opposed to right 
governments, therefore increasing the volatility of public investment. Thus, a dummy variable 
that takes the value one if the largest party in the legislature is coded in DPI as left-leaning, and 
zero otherwise, is used.  
Price of investment goods is another key determinant of public investment. When prices 
are high, the ratio of public investment to GDP is expected to decrease, however this might not 
be true for the ratio of public investment to total investment. If private investors are more 
sensitive to price variations than the public ones, we could observe an increase in the ratio of 
public investment to total investment. 
Economic income and country size are expected to have some impact on public 
investment. Standard macroeconomic theory would predict a positive effect from income, 
nonetheless it is common for developing countries to spend more relative to the GDP or total 
investment than advanced economies to foster the catch up process, or as a result of rent-seeking 
activities. At the same time, bigger countries are expected to invest more than smaller ones 
because they generate a stronger demand, thus population is introduced as a time-varying 
measure of country size. 
Differently from Keefer and Knack (2007), we control for a set of additional covariates 
that are expected to have important effects on the dependent variables. Conflicts depress 
economic activity as well as public investment because resources are typically diverted towards 
defense and military activities, thereby increasing the volatility. Thus, drawing from the Centre 
for the Study of Civil War (CSCW) dataset, we create a dummy variable that takes the value one 
if there are at least 1,000 battle-related deaths, zero otherwise. 
Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) net disbursements can be used by the 
government to invest or free up government resources that can be directed toward public 
investment, therefore exerting a positive impact (Sturm, 2001). At the same time, the 
                                                       
16 As an alternative measure we adopt a laxer version of checks and balances cum elections. 
17 Within/across relative variation is even higher for quality of governance wide (4 against 7.5). 11 
 
unpredictability of aid flows is likely to be reflected in the macroeconomic and fiscal 
environment of the country. Hence, we take the ratio of ODA net disbursements to GDP. 
Likewise, the relief obtained under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) initiative 
could push governments to allocate more resources from the debt service to public investment. 
Hence, a dummy variable to control for such allocation changes is introduced. This takes the 
value one if the country is in the period between the decision point and the completion point of 
the original or enhanced HIPC initiative, zero otherwise. 
 Along the same reasoning, the ratio of central government total revenues and grants as a 
percentage of GDP is introduced. Increased revenues are likely to affect positively the levels of 
public investment (Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997) and, at the same time, increase the volatility of 
public investment if the government tends to spend the new money. However, if the government 
is conservative and builds up a buffer to implement counter-cyclical fiscal policy, the effect on 
the volatility could turn out to be negative. 
On the one hand, natural resources rich countries are likely to foster the investment 
activity both by building up infrastructure to further exploit and generate profits from such 
richness, and by diversifying the productive structure. On the other hand, the price fluctuations 
affect quantities sold and may eventually be reflected in the volatility of public investment. 
Unfortunately, data restrictions do not allow controlling for the overall natural resource 
endowments and the ratio of oil exports to GDP is typically used to proxy it to some extent. 
Nonetheless, oil is just one albeit important of the resources a country may be endowed with and 
there are cases of countries that are resource rich but do not export the commodity. In order to 
take into account these considerations, we employ the sum of the rent from energy depletion 
(crude oil, natural gas, hard coal, and lignite) and rent from oil and minerals (bauxite, copper, 
gold, iron, lead, nickel, phosphate, silver, tin, zinc). Each rent is computed as production volume 




4.2. Empirical Strategy 
While Knack and Keefer (2007) use an averaged cross-section to investigate the impact 
of institutional quality on public investment, we employ the system GMM estimator developed 
by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998).  
Our methodology can be considered superior as it exploits the longitudinal dimension 
and, as specified by Roodman (2006), jointly addresses several potential econometric problems 
since it is specifically designed for situations with (1) few time periods and many individuals; (2) 
a linear functional relationship; (3) a single left hand side variable that is dynamic, depending on 
its own past realizations; (4) independent variables that are not strictly exogenous (possibly 
correlated with past and current realizations of the error); (5) unobserved heterogeneity at 
country level; (6) and heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within individuals, but not across 
them. 
Given our dataset spanning 144 countries over 25 years, a typical persistence in the 
investment variable, some of the explanatory variables (income and price in particular) that may 
be endogenous with public investment, a likely presence of specific country fixed effects, and 
idiosyncratic errors that are heteroskedastic and correlated within but not across individuals, the 
system GMM is instrumental in addressing all these issues. 
To test hypothesis (i) we adopt the same specification as in Keefer and Knack (2007): 
                                                       
18 Oil exports have been used as a robustness check. 12 
 
 
                
                                                                                       
                                            (2) 
 
where the dependent variable                is the ratio of public investment to GDP or to 
total investment;                         is quality of governance or political checks and 
balances;               is the natural logarithm of population in millions;                 
denotes a left-leaning party as the largest party in the legislature;               is the price of 
investment relatively to the United States;             is the growth rate of GDP per capita in 
PPP terms
19;   is a set of unchanging country specific effects (proxied by country dummies);    
are effects common to all countries in period   (time dummies); and     is the error term. All the 
controls are added once at time to check whether results are robust to the progressive loss of 
observations. 
  In order to eliminate the country-effects, we take first differences of equation (1), which 
yields: 
 
                                                                                    
                                                                     (3) 
 
The differentiated error term      is correlated with the lagged dependent variable 
                 by construction. Thus, the difference GMM estimator uses a set of lagged 
explanatory variables to address this problem and the endogeneity of some covariates.
20 
However, in presence of high persistence in the levels of the explanatory variables (with 
levels being weak instruments of the first differences) and small samples, the estimation of 
equation (3) would produce biased estimates. Differently, the system GMM assumes a further 
moment restriction, namely that although explanatory variables might be correlated with the 
unobservable component   , the first differences are uncorrelated with         . Therefore, 
lagged first differences can be used as instruments for the levels of equation (2). In this setting, 
we can estimate a system GMM with the level equation (2) and its differenced form (3), under 
the mentioned moment assumption. 
As suggested in Roodman (2006), we include year effects to control for global factors. 
The autocorrelation test and the robust estimates of the coefficient standard error assume no 
correlation across individuals in the idiosyncratic disturbances and the introduction of time 
dummies makes such assumption more likely to hold. 
                                                       
19 Fisher panel data unit root test could not reject the null hypothesis that all panels contain unit roots for GDP per 
capita in PPP terms. On the contrary, the null hypothesis is rejected when the growth rate of the same variable is 
considered. 
20 The estimation procedure exploits lagged instruments that are weakly exogenous if they are not correlated with 
future error terms. The lagged dependent variable is “predetermined” as it is correlated with past error terms, but 
uncorrelated with the current and future error terms. However, the other variables are potentially endogenous given 
that they are correlated with the current and past error terms, but are assumed to be uncorrelated with future errors. 
In other words, predetermined and endogenous variables are uncorrelated to unanticipated shocks (future error 
terms), albeit expected future dynamics may affect them. Therefore, a set of instruments is given by the lagged 
levels. 13 
 
To check whether the assumptions have been respected, we perform a second-order serial 
correlation test and a Hansen J-test. The first is ensuring that      is uncorrelated with        , 
whereas the second is testing for over-identifying restrictions, that is whether the instruments, as 
a group, appear exogenous.
21 As argued in Roodman (2006), Hansen J-test can be greatly 
weakened by instrument proliferation, hence we collapse the instrument matrix into a vector. 
Deviating from Keefer and Knack (2007), the dependent variable now becomes the 
volatility of public investment as previously defined to test hypothesis (ii) and the indicators of 
infrastructure quality to test hypothesis (iii). Moreover, variables for ODA, revenues and natural 
resources are added to the baseline specification to test hypothesis (iv). More formally, the 
following equation and its differenced form are estimated: 
 
                
                                                                                       
                                                                                        
                      (4) 
 
where                is the public investment ratios, the volatility of those ratios and the 
indicators of public investment quality previously defined.              is a dummy variable for 
ongoing conflicts;        is the share of net disbursements over GDP;             is the total of 
revenues and grants as a percentage of GDP; and          is the value of the rents from energy 
depletion and oil and minerals. As for the estimation of equation (2) and (3), these controls are 
added one at time because they imply a partial loss of observations. Once again, equation (4) and 
its differenced form are estimated with                               on the left hand side. 
  Hypothesis (v) is tested by introducing an interaction term between rents and quality of 
governance (or checks and balances) in equation (4). Since we expect resource rich countries 
with low (high) quality of governance to invest more (less), we should observe a negative 
coefficient on the interaction term.
22 
  Finally, we test hypothesis (vi) by disaggregating the quality of governance additive 
indexes into their subcomponents and estimating equation (4) and its differenced form on them.  
 
4.3. The Impact of Institutional Quality on the Levels of Public Investment 
Keefer and Knack (2007) analysis is replicated in Table 5. Here we estimate the impact 
of institutional quality on the levels of public investment as specified in equation (2) and (3). The 
odd columns show the estimates for quality of governance and the even columns the ones for 
checks and balances, while the independent variables are added one at time. Both the measures 
of institutional quality exert a negative and significant impact on public investment as a share of 
GDP. In the most complete specification in column (7) (column (8)), a ten-point increase in the 
quality of governance (checks and balances) is associated with a reduction in public investment 
of 0.31 (0.96) percent of GDP.  
These estimates are sensibly smaller than the ones obtained by Keefer and Knack (2007), 
and this is likely to be due to two factors. The authors were not able to exclude unobservable 
components and these might have simultaneously influenced average institutional quality and 
                                                       
21 Hansen J-test is preferred to the Sargan one, as the latter is not robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
22 The same hypothesis is also tested by constructing the interaction term between rents and (i) a dummy variable 
that takes value one if the ratio of oil exports to GDP is higher or equal to 30 percent, zero otherwise; and (ii) a 
dummy variable for the Organization of  Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) membership, zero otherwise. 14 
 
average public investment levels. Also, if part of the effect of institutional quality on public 
investment were only evident after a substantial lag, it would not fully show up in the GMM 
estimation results. 
The covariates take the expected sign when significant. More specifically, the price of 
investment negatively affects the quantity and a leftist party invests more. The growth rate of 
income per capita turns out non-significant and the results are robust to its inclusion. 
 
 
[Table 5 about here] 
 
 
Table 6 shows the results employing the same specifications as in Table 5, but shifting 
the dependent variable to the ratio of public investment as a share of total investment. The results 
are consistent with those of the previous table. In the most complete specification in column (7) 
(column (8)) a ten-point increase in the quality of governance (checks and balances) is associated 
with a reduction in public investment of 2.35 (7.36) percent of total investment. Such reduction 
may be either compensated by an increase in private investment or be more dramatic than the fall 
of investments in the private sector. 
Once again, the price of investment is negative and significant and so is the contribution 
brought about by the population variable in the equation for checks and balances. 
 
 
[Table 6 about here] 
 
 
Tables 7 and 8 present some extensions of the models estimated in Tables 5 and 6, 
respectively. More specifically, equation (4) and its differenced form are estimated for public 
investment as a share of GDP in Table 7, with independent variables added one at time. The 
results for quality of governance are consistent with the ones of Keefer and Knack (2007), as the 
most complete specification in column (9) suggests that a ten-point increase in the quality of 
governance is associated with a reduction in public investment of 0.42 percent of GDP. On the 
contrary, the negative coefficient on checks and balances is not statistically different from zero. 
Among the regressors, conflicts show a negative and significant coefficient in column 
(9), implying that public investment is reduced if the country is involved in some sort of battle. 
Interestingly, resources seem to play a relevant role in fostering public investment. In column (9) 
(column (10)), a ten percent increase in ODA is associated with 0.3 (0.52) percent rise in public 
investment as a share of GDP. At the same time, the coefficient on revenues is positive and 
strongly significant, suggesting a growth in the public investment share between 0.41 and 0.44 
percent due to a ten percent increase in revenues in the most complete specifications. Likewise, 
natural resources proxied by rents exert a positive, albeit smaller positive effect on the ratio of 
public investment to GDP. A ten percent increase in rents is associated with an increase in public 
investment between 0.17 and 0.28 percent of GDP.  
 
 




When public investment as a share of total investment is used as dependent variable, as in 
Table 8, the results are mostly confirmed. The negative effect of quality of governance is 
significant and robust to the introduction of other regressors. In the preferred specification of 
column (9), a ten-point increase in quality of governance is associated with a reduction in public 
investment of 1.82 percent of total investment. Although the significance on the coefficient for 
checks and balances appears more robust to the inclusion of other regressors in this table than in 
Table 7, it is lost when rents are added to the specification in column (10). 
The other independent variables confirm what expected. The price of investment is 
negatively correlated with the quantity of public investment, implying that public investment is 
more responsive than private investment to variations in price. Some positive effects are 
observed on the ODA and the revenues variables, but these are weaker and not always significant 
with respect to the ones observed in Table 7. Natural resources are still positively affecting 
public investment with an impact between 1.44 and 1.77 percent of total investment due to an 
increase of 10 percent in rents.  
 
 
[Table 8 about here] 
 
 
Results in column (1) and (2) of Table 9 reject the hypothesis that resource rich countries 
with low institutional quality invest more, as the coefficient on the interaction term is non-
significant. The same hypothesis is rejected in column (3) and (4), where public investment is 
normalized by total investment.  
 
 
[Table 9 about here] 
 
 
Column (1) and (3) of Table 10 present the results for the subcomponents of the quality 
of governance indicator on both public investment ratios. Corruption seems to be the only 
channel through which quality of governance is significantly affecting the ratio of public 
investment to GDP. On the other hand, the ratio of public investment to total investment is 
negatively and significantly associated only with bureaucracy quality. 
Government stability and democratic accountability are the additional subcomponents of 
the index quality of governance wide, thus not included in the quality of governance index used 
in the regressions of the previous tables. Even when such subcomponents are added, the negative 
impact of corruption and bureaucracy quality is confirmed. Moreover, column (2) shows that 
government stability is positively affecting public investment, suggesting that instability (proxied 








Overall, the findings of Keefer and Knack (2007) are confirmed when the same 
specification is used in a panel setup, suggesting that capital spending may be used as a vehicle 
for rent-seeking in low institutional quality settings, or that public investment may compensate 
the low levels of private investments. 
While quality of governance conserves a significant negative relationship with public 
investment, the negative effect exerted by checks and balances disappears when other controls 
are added.
23 ODA, revenues and natural resources contribute positively to capital spending. In 
line with Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) and Mauro (1998), we observe that corruption is associated, 
albeit weakly, with higher public investment as a share of GDP. However, the variable becomes 
insignificant when the dependent variable is the ratio of public investment to total investment. 
 
4.4. The Impact of Institutional Quality on the Volatility of Public Investment 
The estimates for the volatility of public investment are presented in Tables 11 and 12. 
Table 11 shows the impact of quality of governance and checks and balances on the volatility of 
the ratio of public investment to GDP, highlighting an unambiguous negative and significant 
impact of the former and a negative but weakly or not always significant impact of the latter. In 
our preferred specification of column (9), a ten-point increase in quality of governance is 
associated with a reduction in the volatility of public investment as a share of GDP of 4.58 
percentage points. 
Among the regressors, a higher population is associated with less volatility in public 
investment. The ODA variable presents a significant and positive coefficient in the most 
complete specifications. In other words, aid flows seem to increase the volatility of capital 
spending and this reflects the poor predictability of aid flows. Likewise, column (10) suggests 
that being a resource rich country significantly increases the volatility of public investment as 
expected. This may be due to the unpredictable revenues that the resource dependence generates, 
which increase the volatility of all spending. 
Interestingly, revenue increases are associated with less volatility and this could be the 
result of the effect of automatic stabilizers or more generally improved macroeconomic 
management, however the coefficient is significant only in the even columns. 
 
 
[Table 11 about here] 
 
 
In Table 12 the dependent variable is the volatility of public investment as a share of total 
investment. Quality of governance and checks and balances affect negatively the volatility of 
public investment, but the effect of the latter is not different from zero in some specifications. 
More precisely, column (9) suggests that a ten-point increase in quality of governance is 
associated with a reduction in the volatility of public investment as a share of total investment of 
4.58 percentage points. 
The picture drawn by looking at the covariates does not change from the previous table. 
Population is still associated with lower volatility, whereas ODA and natural resource with 
higher volatility of public investment. The negative and significant coefficients for revenues in 
                                                       
23 The results provide some evidence for the claim that checks and balances matter, though the effects are less 
significant than for quality of governance, as expected, or Keefer and Knack (2007). 17 
 
column (8) and (10) suggest that revenues are well managed and translated in capital 
expenditures that smooth the investment cycle. 
 
 
[Table 12 about here] 
 
 
Finally, Table 13 presents the effects exerted by the subcomponents of quality of 
governance on the volatility of public investment. All the variables take the expected negative 
sign regardless of the ratio used as a dependent variable. The only significant effect on the 
volatility of the ratio of public investment to GDP is observed on law and order and, despite the 
large magnitude, it is only borderline significant in the specification that includes the 
subcomponents of quality of governance. When the dependent variable is the volatility of the 
ratio of public investment to total investment, the significant variable is bureaucracy quality. 
 
 
[Table 13 about here] 
 
 
In general, volatile public investment is associated with lower institutional quality, and 
similarly to what happened for the investment levels, quality of governance turns out to be robust 
to the inclusion of additional regressors. This result might be due to the fact that partisan and 
electoral shocks are more frequent in weak institutional quality countries, resulting in more 
variation in capital spending. Or more simply, if capital spending embeds more rent-seeking 
when institutional quality is weak, it should be more volatile. 
Interestingly, while ODA and natural resources increase the volatility of public 
investment, an increase in revenues is associated with its reduction, implying a good 
macroeconomic management that results in a smoother investment cycle. Among the single 
subcomponents of quality of governance, law and order and bureaucracy quality seem to be the 
most affecting ones. 
 
4.5. The Impact of Institutional Quality on the Quality of Infrastructure 
Tables 14, 15 and 16 show the results for the effects of quality of governance on the 
quality of infrastructure. In Table 14, the dependent variable is paved roads as a percentage of 
total roads, proxying transport infrastructure quality. None of the regressors turns out significant, 
most likely because of the extremely low variation within countries, also observable by looking 
at the high coefficient for the lag of the dependent variable. Therefore, the between variation is 
captured by the fixed effects. 
 
 
[Table 14 about here] 
 
 
In Table 15 we employ electric power system losses as a percentage of total power 
outputs (rescaled) as a dependent variable. We observe that institutional quality is positively 
correlated with energy infrastructure quality. The effect becomes insignificant for checks and 18 
 
balances only when all the regressors are included, even though the coefficient is close to the 10 
percent significance threshold. 
The most complete specification for checks and balances in column (10) shows a 
negative effect from ODA and a positive one from revenues. Moreover, resource rich countries 
experience lower levels of quality of energy infrastructure. 
 
 
[Table 15 about here] 
 
 
Finally, Table 16 presents the results for faults per 100 main fixed lines per year 
(rescaled), proxying quality in the telecommunications infrastructure. Quality of governance 
exerts a positive impact on the dependent variable, whereas checks and balances are positive but 
non-significant.  
Once again, ODA and revenues are respectively and significantly negative and positive in 
the equations for checks and balances. During conflicts, interruptions in the telecommunications 




[Table 16 about here] 
 
 
When we disaggregate the quality of governance indicator into its subcomponents in 
Table 17, law and order displays a positive and significant effect on both energy and 
telecommunication infrastructure quality. Moreover, a positive contribution is observed also on 
bureaucracy quality when the dependent variable is the quality of energy infrastructure. 
 
 
[Table 17 about here] 
 
 
Although these results broadly confirm a positive relationship between infrastructure 
quality in some sectors and quality of governance, they should be taken cautiously. The poor 
data availability and the focus on some specific sectors are causes of concerns. 
If these results were considered reliable, they would be inconsistent with the idea that 
public investment (in some infrastructure sectors) is offsetting private investment in weak 
institutional settings. If there was an authentic substitution, public investment quality (proxied by 
infrastructure quality) should be higher even at low levels of governance. 
 
 
5.  Conclusions 
In this paper we conduct an empirical analysis of the impact of institutional quality on the 
levels of public investment. The investigation extends the cross-country analysis carried out by 
Keefer and Knack (2007) by looking at the more recent time span of 1984-2008, using a broader 
sample and by analyzing the effects of aid, revenues and natural resources. While the panel 19 
 
dataset allows correcting for a set of relevant econometric issues, we also explore the effects of 
institutional quality on the volatility of public investment and on the quality of infrastructure and 
we look at which channel is contributing the most to the changes in these variables. 
By and large, the findings of Keefer and Knack (2007) are confirmed when the same 
specification is used in a panel framework, suggesting an inverse association between public 
investment levels and institutional quality albeit with a smaller magnitude. Aid, revenues and 
natural resources abundance, on the other hand, contribute positively to capital spending, 
however there are no higher effects in settings where natural resources are high and institutional 
quality is low. 
Contrary to Keefer and Knack (2007), we find some evidence of what has been argued in 
Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) and Mauro (1998) as our results suggest that corruption is the 
subcomponent of quality of governance that significantly contributes to the increase in the levels 
of public investment as a share of GDP. However, this is not true for the ratio of public 
investment to total investment, which is only significantly affected by bureaucracy quality. 
These results support the idea that public investment can be used by governments as a 
vehicle for rent-seeking. If so, politicians are likely to push investment projects on the base of 
how much they can extract from them instead of looking at economic return and feasibility 
indicators. As a result, capital spending offers a misleading proxy for public capital stock, 
because of the misconduct surrounding project selection and government procurement practices 
that can vary substantially across countries and over time (see Pritchett, 2000). An alternative 
interpretation is that governments might increase public investment to compensate for the fall in 
private investment due to inability to create an attractive business environment.  
Volatility of public investment is associated with lower institutional quality, suggesting 
that more frequent partisan and electoral shocks are likely to affect the size of the changes in 
capital spending. This result has operational relevance because highly volatile capital spending 
entails second-round effects on the required operation and maintenance expenditures. The 
variations of the latter adversely affect the contribution of public investment to development. 
Interestingly, while aid and natural resources increase the volatility of public investment, an 
increase in revenues is associated with its reduction, suggesting a proper macroeconomic 
management that results in a smoother investment cycle.
24 Among the single subcomponents of 
quality of governance, bureaucracy quality and law and order seem to be the most affecting ones. 
Finally, as expected institutional quality is positively associated to some measures of 
infrastructure quality, and bureaucracy quality and law and order seem again to be the relevant 
subcomponents. This result would be inconsistent with the idea that public investment is 
offsetting the fall in private investment, since, if this was true, public investment quality should 
be high even when institutional quality is low. Nonetheless, these results should be treated 
cautiously because of data limitations. 
These findings have policy implications. Public investment needs institutional capacity to 
be efficient. The pressure exerted by widening global imbalances and infrastructure gaps should 
be reduced through capital spending only when governments commit themselves to put in place 
policies that limit misconduct, in particular in the area of corruption, bureaucracy quality, and 
law and order. These should guarantee a higher quality of governance that is likely to promote 
less but higher quality and more productive public investment. At the same time, these reforms 
                                                       
24 It could be argued that volatile capital investment is not necessarily a bad outcome as countries might enjoy lump 
sum investments that are still beneficial. However, in general terms a good macroeconomic management should 
smooth the business cycle and therefore organize the public investment activities over time. 20 
 
are likely to generate less frequent partisan and electoral shocks and a better macroeconomic 
management resulting in lower volatility of capital spending.  
The evidence suggests that GDP measures are likely to be overestimated for low 
institutional quality countries because the value added of public investment is lower than what is 
registered at cost. As stated in Stiglitz (2009), the increase in the share of government output in 
GDP in the last 60 years underscores the importance of addressing what he defined as “GDP 
Fetishism”, by analyzing which is the real contribution of the government sectors to GDP.  
Further research is needed to understand whether these results are evidence of rent-
seeking behaviors or rather inability of the governments to create the appropriate business 
environment to foster private investment. Moreover, the relationship between quality of 
institutions and quality of infrastructure needs to be explored with better and more 
comprehensive data. Finally, it could be instructive to carry out in depth case studies for those 
countries that have weak institutional quality but do not produce opportunities for misconduct. 
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Table A: Variables and Sources 
Variable  Source  Definition 
Public Investment / GDP  WEO  Gross public fixed capital formation as a percentage of GDP. 
Public Investment / Total 
Investment  WEO  Gross public fixed capital formation as a percentage of total investment. 
Volatility of Public Investment / 
GDP  WEO 
Absolute value of the percentage change in the deviation of the ratio of public investment to 
GDP, from the trend component extrapolated using the HP filter, minus the same deviation 
at time t-1, normalized by the trend at time t-1. 
Volatility of Public Investment / 
Total Investment  WEO 
Absolute value of the percentage change in the deviation of the ratio of public investment to 
total investment, from the trend component extrapolated using the HP filter, minus the same 
deviation at time t-1, normalized by the trend at time t-1. 
Quality of Governance  ICRG 
Additive index constructed with three ICRG variables: bureaucracy quality, corruption and 
law and order. These variables have been rescaled on a range 0 to 10, therefore the index is 
measured on a scale of 0 to 30, with higher values indicating better quality of governance. 
Quality of Governance Wide  ICRG 
Additive index constructed with five ICRG variables: bureaucracy quality, corruption, law 
and order, government stability and democratic accountability. These variables have been 
rescaled on a range 0 to 10, therefore the index is measured on a scale of 0 to 50, with 
higher values indicating better quality of governance. 
Checks and Balances  DPI 
Measure of Checks and Balances cum elections. This measure is a function of the number 
of parties in the government coalition (for parliamentary systems), whether the president's 
party has a majority in the legislature (presidential systems), whether elections are governed 
by closed-list or open-list rules (with the former granting more authority to the heads of 
parties) and of the DPI's legislative index of electoral competitiveness. 
Checks and Balances Lax  DPI  Laxer measure of Checks and Balances cum elections. 
Bureaucracy Quality  ICRG 
Institutional strength and quality of the bureaucracy is a shock absorber that tends to 
minimize revisions of policy when governments change. In low-risk countries, the 
bureaucracy is somewhat autonomous from political pressure. This variable has been 
rescaled on a range 0 to 10.  
Corruption  ICRG 
A measure of corruption within the political system that is a threat to foreign investment by 
distorting the economic and financial environment, reducing the efficiency of government 
and business by enabling people to assume positions of power through patronage rather 
than ability, and introducing inherent instability into the political process. This variable has 
been rescaled on a range 0 to 10.  
Law and Order  ICRG 
Two measures comprising one risk component. Each sub-component equals half of the 
total. The "law" sub-component assesses the strength and impartiality of the legal system, 
and the "order" sub-component assesses popular observance of the law. This variable has 
been rescaled on a range 0 to 10.  
Government Stability 
ICRG 
A measure of the government's ability to stay in office and carry out its declared 
program(s), depending upon such factors as the type of governance, cohesion of the 
government and governing parties, approach of an election and command of the legislature. 
This variable has been rescaled on a range 0 to 10.  
Democratic Accountability 
ICRG 
A measure of, not just whether there are free and fair elections, but how responsive 
government is to its people. The less responsive it is, the more likely it will fall. This 
variable has been rescaled on a range 0 to 10.  
Population  WDI  Natural logarithm of populations in millions. 
Leftist Party  DPI  Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the largest party in the legislature is coded in DPI 
as left-leaning, zero otherwise. 
Price of Investment Goods  Penn World Tables  Price level of investment goods in a country relative to prices in the United States, where 
the value is 100. 25 
 
Table A: Variables and Sources (continued) 
Variable  Source  Definition 
Income per capita  WDI  Growth rate of GDP per capita in PPP terms. 
Conflicts  CSCW  Dummy variable that takes the value one if there are at least 1,000 battle-related deaths, zero 
otherwise. 
ODA  OECD  Overseas Development Assistance net disbursements as a percentage of GDP. 
HIPC  World Bank  Dummy variable that takes the value one if the country is in the period between the decision 
point and the completion point of the original or enhanced HIPC initiative, zero otherwise. 
Revenues  WEO  Central government total revenues and grants as a percentage of GDP. 
Rents  World Bank 
Sum of rent from energy depletion (crude oil, natural gas, hard coal and lignite) and rent from 
oil and minerals (bauxite, copper, gold, iron, lead, nickel, phosphate, silver, tin, zinc). The 
rent is computed as production volume multiplied by the difference between international 
market price and average unit production cost. 
Paved Roads / Total Roads  WDI 
Paved roads are those surfaced with crushed stone (macadam) and hydrocarbon binder or 
bituminized agents, with concrete, or with cobblestones, as a percentage of all the country's 
roads, measured in length. 
Electric Power System Losses as a 
percentage of Total Power Outputs   WDI  The percentage of transmission and distribution losses in the production of electricity. This 
variable has been rescaled by subtracting each value to the maximum. 





Ratio of the total number of reported faults for the year to the total number of main lines in 
operation and multiplying by 100.  This variable has been rescaled by subtracting each value 




Table 1: Public Investment per Quartile of Quality of Governance and Checks and Balances 
   Obs.  Public 
Investment/GDP 
Obs.  Public 
Investment/Total 
Investment 
Quality of Governance         
1st quartile  590  6.4  598  34.7 
2nd quartile  629  6.3  647  32.7 
3rd quartile  586  6.8  587  34.3 
4th quartile  554  4.3  559  18.7 
Checks and Balances         
1st quartile  1028  8.2  1035  38.1 
2nd quartile  998  6.1  988  31.8 
3rd quartile  535  5.2  538  23.8 
4th quartile  313  5.3  313  26.6 
Notes: The observations are the ones used in the regressions of public investment on 
institutional quality without controls. 
 
Figure 1: Scatter plots, Probability Density Functions and Linear Predictions of Public Investment levels and Institutional Quality 
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Table 2: Volatility of Public Investment per Quartile of Quality of Governance and Checks and Balances 
   Obs.  Volatility of Public 
Investment/GDP 
Obs.  Volatility of Public 
Investment/Total 
Investment 
Quality of Governance         
1st quartile  581  19.0  589  18.5 
2nd quartile  619  16.7  640  15.7 
3rd quartile  580  15.2  581  14.4 
4th quartile  538  8.0  544  8.3 
Checks and Balances         
1st quartile  1022  19.6  1011  18.0 
2nd quartile  980  15.4  973  14.9 
3rd quartile  527  12.8  532  13.2 
4th quartile  306  10.6  306  10.5 
Notes: The observations are the ones used in the regressions of the volatility of public investment on 
institutional quality without controls. 
 
Figure 2: Scatter plots, Probability Density Functions and Linear Predictions of Public Investment volatility and Institutional Quality 
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Table 3: Quality of Infrastructure per Quartile of Quality of Governance and Checks and Balances 
   Obs.  Paved Roads / Total 
Roads 
Obs.  Electric Power 
System Losses / 
Total Power Output 
(rescaled) 
Obs.  Faults per 100 main 
(fixed) lines per year 
(rescaled) 
Quality of Governance             
1st quartile  326  29.7  680  80.8  279  95.7 
2nd quartile  341  38.3  773  84.8  282  95.9 
3rd quartile  295  60.4  522  88.4  263  96.8 
4th quartile  312  78.0  658  92.8  273  98.6 
Checks and Balances             
1st quartile  417  44.7  892  84.1  381  95.3 
2nd quartile  509  46.2  917  83.3  473  96.5 
3rd quartile  309  53.8  542  88.4  255  96.9 
4th quartile  254  67.4  422  89.0  204  97.0 
Notes: The observations are the ones used in the regressions of the quality of infrastructure on institutional quality without 
controls. 
 
Figure 3: Scatter plots, Probability Density Functions and Linear Predictions of Infrastructure and Institutional Quality 
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Table 4: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable  Obs.  Mean  SD 
         Across  Within 
Public Investment / GDP  3254  6.7  4.4  3.2 
Public Investment / Total Investment  3256  32.1  17.0  13.0 
Volatility of Public Investment / GDP  3188  16.8  11.3  18.8 
Volatility of Public Investment / Total Investment  3196  15.9  10.2  17.9 
Quality of Governance  2490  15.9  5.6  2.6 
Quality of Governance Wide  2490  28.3  7.6  4.0 
Checks and Balances  3039  2.6  1.3  1.0 
Checks and Balances Lax  3006  2.6  1.3  1.0 
Bureaucracy Quality  2490  5.1  2.4  1.3 
Corruption  2490  4.8  1.7  1.1 
Law and Order  2490  5.9  2.0  1.3 
Government Stability  2490  6.4  0.8  1.7 
Democratic Accountability  2490  6.0  2.2  1.4 
Population  3284  15.7  1.9  0.1 
Leftist Party  3287  0.3  0.3  0.3 
Price of Investment Goods  3097  68.9  41.0  35.3 
Income per capita (growth rate)  3146  5.0  2.5  5.3 
Conflicts  3287  0.1  0.1  0.2 
ODA  3281  5.9  7.6  5.0 
HIPC  3287  0.0  0.1  0.2 
Revenues  3041  23.8  9.9  5.2 
Rents  3147  5.7  12.0  6.4 
Paved Roads / Total Roads  1433  47.5  31.4  4.8 
Electric Power System Losses as a percentage of 
Total Power Outputs   2205  213.0  13.4  7.8 
Faults per 100 main fixed lines per year   1328  1439.3  72.2  58.4 
Notes: Data sources and units of measurement are presented in the Appendix.  
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Table 5: The impact of Institutional Quality on Public Investment/GDP 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Lag dependent  0.729***  0.567***  0.723***  0.564***  0.742***  0.567***  0.756***  0.776*** 
   variable  (0.115)  (0.198)  (0.116)  (0.197)  (0.105)  (0.198)  (0.112)  (0.088) 
Quality of  -0.037***    -0.039***    -0.036***    -0.031**   
   Governance  (0.013)    (0.014)    (0.013)    (0.013)   
Checks and    -0.177    -0.159    -0.169*    -0.096* 
   Balances    (0.107)    (0.103)    (0.100)    (0.053) 
Population      0.017  -0.134  0.005  -0.129  -0.002  -0.071 
   (log)      (0.071)  (0.118)  (0.067)  (0.119)  (0.067)  (0.054) 
Leftist Party      0.383**  0.252  0.328**  0.201  0.300**  0.200 
      (0.166)  (0.235)  (0.148)  (0.232)  (0.146)  (0.132) 
Price of Investment          -0.006**  -0.004  -0.007  -0.008* 
          (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.005) 
GDP per capita              -0.013  0.002 
              (0.019)  (0.019) 
Constant  2.305**  3.538**  1.980*  5.595*  2.589**  5.873**  2.755**  3.658*** 
  (0.927)  (1.620)  (1.188)  (2.982)  (1.101)  (2.808)  (1.162)  (1.248) 
Countries  116  144  116  144  115  143  114  141 
Instruments  28  28  30  30  30  30  32  32 
AR(2) test [p-value]  0.319  0.721  0.332  0.711  0.381  0.637  0.378  0.565 
Hansen J [p-value]  0.713  0.644  0.751  0.621  0.806  0.912  0.737  0.224 
Observations 
2,359  2,874  2,356  2,871  2,210  2,705  2,156  2,614 
Notes: GMM specifications include year effects and use lag 1 of the endogenous variables with collapsed instrument matrix. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 6: The impact of Quality of Institutional Quality on Public Investment/Total Investment 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Lag dependent  0.701***  0.623***  0.720***  0.637***  0.702***  0.619***  0.681***  0.597*** 
   variable  (0.124)  (0.088)  (0.132)  (0.091)  (0.128)  (0.094)  (0.126)  (0.104) 
Quality of  -0.268**    -0.255**    -0.258**    -0.235**   
   Governance  (0.110)    (0.115)    (0.112)    (0.111)   
Checks and    -0.684**    -0.582**    -0.723**    -0.736** 
   Balances    (0.291)    (0.277)    (0.301)    (0.301) 
Population      -0.391  -0.522  -0.519  -0.541  -0.589  -0.685* 
   (log)      (0.374)  (0.328)  (0.397)  (0.346)  (0.462)  (0.404) 
Leftist Party      1.705*  0.980  1.559*  0.747  1.224  0.659 
      (0.886)  (0.861)  (0.864)  (0.897)  (0.780)  (0.877) 
Price of Investment          -0.041***  -0.045***  -0.052***  -0.063*** 
          (0.015)  (0.016)  (0.018)  (0.021) 
GDP per capita              -0.317  -0.318 
              (0.373)  (0.484) 
Constant  11.895**  12.765***  17.109  20.198***  22.839**  24.570***  27.628**  31.290*** 
  (5.052)  (3.167)  (10.405)  (7.519)  (10.375)  (7.793)  (11.582)  (10.538) 
Countries  116  142  116  142  115  141  114  139 
Instruments  28  28  30  30  30  30  32  32 
AR(2) test [p-value]  0.992  0.722  0.928  0.781  0.968  0.751  0.975  0.636 
Hansen J [p-value]  0.852  0.332  0.768  0.329  0.629  0.923  0.635  0.363 
Observations  2,391  2,874  2,388  2,871  2,239  2,707  2,184  2,617 
Notes: GMM specifications include year effects and use lag 2 of the endogenous variables with collapsed instrument matrix. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 7: Extensions, the impact of Institutional Quality, Conflicts and Resources on Public Investment/GDP 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Lag dependent  0.754***  0.774***  0.751***  0.765***  0.751***  0.765***  0.599***  0.657***  0.597***  0.656*** 
   variable  (0.114)  (0.088)  (0.118)  (0.091)  (0.118)  (0.091)  (0.094)  (0.100)  (0.094)  (0.097) 
Quality of  -0.033**    -0.028**    -0.028**    -0.057***    -0.042***   
   Governance  (0.014)    (0.013)    (0.013)    (0.016)    (0.015)   
Checks and    -0.097*    -0.068    -0.068    -0.097    -0.069 
   Balances    (0.053)    (0.049)    (0.049)    (0.068)    (0.065) 
Population  0.008  -0.066  0.020  -0.025  0.020  -0.024  0.203  0.095  0.218  0.081 
   (log)  (0.071)  (0.054)  (0.076)  (0.051)  (0.076)  (0.051)  (0.138)  (0.086)  (0.138)  (0.090) 
Leftist Party  0.301**  0.197  0.275*  0.173  0.275*  0.170  0.160  0.055  0.123  0.028 
  (0.148)  (0.133)  (0.143)  (0.135)  (0.143)  (0.135)  (0.219)  (0.179)  (0.230)  (0.181) 
Price of Investment  -0.007  -0.008*  -0.006  -0.007  -0.006  -0.007  -0.004  -0.006*  -0.001  -0.003 
  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
GDP per capita  -0.013  0.002  -0.014  0.002  -0.014  0.002  -0.020  0.000  -0.016  0.003 
  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.015)  (0.018)  (0.016)  (0.019) 
Conflicts  -0.290  -0.198  -0.281  -0.245  -0.281  -0.248  -0.418  -0.199  -0.504*  -0.262 
  (0.282)  (0.233)  (0.279)  (0.238)  (0.278)  (0.239)  (0.289)  (0.244)  (0.262)  (0.229) 
ODA      0.013  0.039**  0.013  0.040**  0.020  0.046***  0.030*  0.052*** 
      (0.014)  (0.016)  (0.015)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.017)  (0.016)  (0.017) 
HIPC          -0.012  -0.109  0.164  0.103  0.235  0.082 
          (0.224)  (0.246)  (0.265)  (0.274)  (0.267)  (0.284) 
Revenues              0.053***  0.050***  0.041***  0.044*** 
              (0.015)  (0.014)  (0.014)  (0.014) 
Rents                  0.028**  0.017* 
                  (0.012)  (0.009) 
Constant  2.632**  3.597***  2.316*  2.683**  2.318*  2.677**  -0.908  0.067  -1.615  0.031 
  (1.172)  (1.234)  (1.201)  (1.093)  (1.201)  (1.092)  (2.281)  (1.459)  (2.219)  (1.493) 
Countries  114  141  114  141  114  141  106  130  104  129 
Instruments  33  33  34  34  35  35  36  36  37  37 
AR(2) test [p-value]  0.392  0.571  0.397  0.583  0.396  0.583  0.576  0.424  0.921  0.264 
Hansen J [p-value]  0.74  0.221  0.769  0.221  0.769  0.222  0.206  0.124  0.947  0.164 
Observations  2,156  2,614  2,156  2,614  2,156  2,614  2,019  2,429  1,980  2,386 
Notes: GMM specifications include year effects and use lag 1 of the endogenous variables with collapsed instrument matrix.  Robust standard errors are 




Table 8: Extensions, the impact of Institutional Quality, Conflicts and Resources on Public Investment/Total Investment 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Lag dependent  0.681***  0.597***  0.668***  0.598***  0.669***  0.599***  0.715***  0.583***  0.713***  0.608*** 
   variable  (0.126)  (0.104)  (0.128)  (0.106)  (0.128)  (0.107)  (0.151)  (0.116)  (0.162)  (0.126) 
Quality of  -0.239**    -0.213**    -0.211**    -0.255***    -0.182**   
   Governance  (0.113)    (0.088)    (0.087)    (0.092)    (0.085)   
Checks and    -0.735**    -0.550**    -0.551**    -0.567**    -0.337 
   Balances    (0.301)    (0.273)    (0.273)    (0.288)    (0.253) 
Population  -0.570  -0.689*  -0.511  -0.478  -0.508  -0.478  -0.047  -0.053  0.003  -0.173 
   (log)  (0.459)  (0.404)  (0.419)  (0.366)  (0.415)  (0.364)  (0.361)  (0.376)  (0.365)  (0.371) 
Leftist Party  1.230  0.659  1.114  0.503  1.128  0.513  0.705  0.252  0.725  0.269 
  (0.785)  (0.875)  (0.768)  (0.808)  (0.770)  (0.813)  (0.717)  (0.871)  (0.766)  (0.841) 
Price of Investment 
-
0.052***  -0.063***  -0.049**  -0.058***  -0.049**  -0.058***  -0.046** 
-
0.060***  -0.030  -0.041* 
  (0.018)  (0.021)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.020)  (0.018)  (0.023)  (0.026)  (0.024) 
GDP per capita  -0.316  -0.305  -0.363  -0.511  -0.357  -0.505  -0.256  -0.444  -0.342  -0.478 
  (0.371)  (0.480)  (0.425)  (0.571)  (0.431)  (0.577)  (0.341)  (0.425)  (0.355)  (0.437) 
Conflicts  -0.577  0.235  -0.564  -0.123  -0.532  -0.110  -0.537  0.043  -0.992  -0.497 
  (1.281)  (1.338)  (1.248)  (1.344)  (1.270)  (1.358)  (1.270)  (1.349)  (1.194)  (1.282) 
ODA      0.074  0.196*  0.067  0.193*  0.038  0.205*  0.072  0.225 
      (0.134)  (0.101)  (0.140)  (0.106)  (0.161)  (0.124)  (0.183)  (0.138) 
HIPC          0.733  0.382  1.367  1.124  1.725  0.982 
          (1.436)  (1.415)  (1.356)  (1.387)  (1.402)  (1.478) 
Revenues              0.144***  0.132**  0.084*  0.074 
              (0.051)  (0.052)  (0.044)  (0.046) 
Rents                  0.144**  0.177*** 
                  (0.066)  (0.063) 
Constant  27.349**  31.243***  26.373***  27.767***  26.197***  27.688***  13.435  17.262**  11.397  17.059* 
  (11.437)  (10.443)  (9.581)  (10.104)  (9.594)  (10.137)  (8.728)  (8.427)  (8.871)  (8.779) 
Countries  114  139  114  139  114  139  106  129  104  128 
Instruments  33  33  34  34  35  35  36  36  37  37 
AR(2) test [p-value]  0.980  0.642  0.996  0.650  0.996  0.652  0.669  0.931  0.712  0.970 
Hansen J [p-value]  0.635  0.371  0.630  0.340  0.624  0.337  0.334  0.143  0.722  0.166 
Observations 
2,184  2,617  2,184  2,617  2,184  2,617  2,024  2,419  1,985  2,376 
Notes: GMM specifications include year effects and use lag 2 of the endogenous variables with collapsed instrument matrix.  Robust standard errors are in 




Table 9: The impact of Resource Richness and Low Institutional Quality on 
Public Investment 
  
Public Investment / 
GDP    
Public Investment / 
Total Investment 
   (1)  (2)    (3)  (4) 
Lag dependent  0.600***  0.656***    0.722***  0.608*** 
   variable  (0.093)  (0.097)    (0.160)  (0.126) 
Quality of  -0.051***      -0.205**   
   Governance  (0.018)      (0.098)   
Checks and    -0.075      -0.286 
   Balances    (0.073)      (0.299) 
Population  0.228  0.081    0.034  -0.176 
   (log)  (0.139)  (0.090)    (0.352)  (0.370) 
Leftist Party  0.166  0.030    0.846  0.247 
  (0.232)  (0.183)    (0.743)  (0.847) 
Price of Investment  -0.001  -0.003    -0.031  -0.042* 
  (0.004)  (0.004)    (0.026)  (0.023) 
GDP per capita  -0.015  0.003    -0.327  -0.470 
  (0.016)  (0.019)    (0.349)  (0.434) 
Conflicts  -0.492*  -0.263    -0.914  -0.482 
  (0.259)  (0.230)    (1.165)  (1.277) 
ODA  0.030*  0.052***    0.066  0.227 
  (0.016)  (0.017)    (0.182)  (0.139) 
HIPC  0.241  0.082    1.749  0.982 
  (0.269)  (0.283)    (1.387)  (1.477) 
Revenues  0.039***  0.044***    0.077*  0.072 
  (0.014)  (0.014)    (0.041)  (0.045) 
Rents  -0.023  0.014    -0.009  0.203*** 
  (0.034)  (0.016)    (0.155)  (0.074) 
Quality of Gov. *  0.004      0.012   
Rents  (0.003)      (0.010)   
Checks and Bal. *     0.001      -0.011 
Rents    (0.005)      (0.025) 
Constant  -1.640  0.036    11.054  16.987* 
  (2.176)  (1.491)    (8.621)  (8.754) 
Countries  104  129    104  128 
Instruments  38  38    38  38 
AR(2) test [p-value]  0.885  0.263    0.707  0.971 
Hansen J [p-value]  0.937  0.165    0.700  0.161 
Observations  1,980  2,386    1,985  2,376 
Notes: GMM specifications include year effects and use lag 1 of the endogenous 
variables in column (1) and (2) and lag 2 in column (3) and (4) with collapsed 
instrument matrix.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 




Table 10: The impact of the subcomponents of Quality of Governance on Public 
Investment 
 
Public Investment / 
GDP    
Public Investment / 
Total Investment 
   (1)  (2)    (3)  (4) 
Lag dependent  0.597***  0.604***    0.607***  0.607*** 
   variable  (0.094)  (0.092)    (0.094)  (0.092) 
Bureaucracy  -0.059  -0.028    -0.516**  -0.420* 
   Quality  (0.048)  (0.044)    (0.239)  (0.230) 
Corruption  -0.110*  -0.090*    -0.344  -0.242 
  (0.062)  (0.051)    (0.226)  (0.219) 
Law and Order  0.043  0.022    0.154  0.161 
  (0.061)  (0.056)    (0.272)  (0.279) 
Government    0.118**      -0.072 
   Stability    (0.048)      (0.241) 
Democratic    -0.087      -0.311 
   Accountability    (0.060)      (0.247) 
Countries  106  106    106  106 
Instruments  39  41    42  44 
AR(2) test [p-value]  0.541  0.516    0.626  0.628 
Hansen J [p-value]  0.175  0.216    0.100  0.104 
Observations  2,017  2,017     2,022  2,022 
Notes: GMM specifications include year effects and use lag 1 in column (1) and 
(2) and lag 2 from column (3) and (4) of the endogenous variables with collapsed 
instrument matrix. Population (log), GDP per capita, Conflicts, ODA, HIPC, 
Revenues, Oil Exports and the constant term are included in all the regressions. 
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 
5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 11: The impact of Institutional Quality, Conflicts and Resources on the of Volatility Public Investment/GDP 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Lag dependent  0.405*  0.332***  0.419*  0.342***  0.420*  0.343***  0.385*  0.281***  0.350  0.269*** 
   variable  (0.233)  (0.125)  (0.229)  (0.124)  (0.230)  (0.125)  (0.210)  (0.100)  (0.219)  (0.101) 
Quality of  -0.610**    -0.495**    -0.493**    -0.525**    -0.458**   
   Governance  (0.273)    (0.226)    (0.227)    (0.218)    (0.208)   
Checks and    -0.859**    -0.574    -0.578    -0.780*    -0.532 
   Balances    (0.397)    (0.379)    (0.378)    (0.409)    (0.412) 
Population  -1.717**  -0.926*  -1.481**  -0.533  -1.478**  -0.543  -1.508**  -1.246**  -1.494**  -1.433*** 
   (log)  (0.720)  (0.517)  (0.651)  (0.562)  (0.650)  (0.552)  (0.697)  (0.540)  (0.628)  (0.519) 
Leftist Party  1.167  0.316  0.665  0.043  0.686  0.086  -0.064  -0.297  -0.202  -0.424 
  (1.327)  (1.444)  (1.364)  (1.455)  (1.355)  (1.437)  (1.247)  (1.390)  (1.204)  (1.379) 
Price of Investment  -0.041  -0.015  -0.034  -0.005  -0.034  -0.005  -0.003  0.021  0.006  0.042 
  (0.049)  (0.048)  (0.050)  (0.050)  (0.050)  (0.050)  (0.051)  (0.056)  (0.056)  (0.070) 
GDP per capita  1.950  1.987  1.946  2.036  1.946  2.025  2.032  2.084*  1.950*  2.200** 
  (1.228)  (1.784)  (1.222)  (1.809)  (1.225)  (1.797)  (1.240)  (1.184)  (1.062)  (1.084) 
Conflicts  -1.167  4.392  -1.095  3.958  -1.072  3.980  -1.125  4.068  -0.044  4.620 
  (3.035)  (4.068)  (3.051)  (4.098)  (3.033)  (4.083)  (2.820)  (4.064)  (3.112)  (4.240) 
ODA      0.222  0.331***  0.215  0.319***  0.230  0.335***  0.292*  0.407*** 
      (0.141)  (0.127)  (0.143)  (0.123)  (0.141)  (0.113)  (0.159)  (0.123) 
HIPC          0.762  1.485  1.107  0.916  1.238  0.632 
          (2.520)  (2.792)  (2.580)  (2.528)  (2.651)  (2.665) 
Revenues              -0.038  -0.189*  -0.102  -0.267*** 
              (0.076)  (0.097)  (0.090)  (0.102) 
Rents                  0.168  0.223* 
                  (0.131)  (0.130) 
Constant  31.727**  11.103  24.884*  1.462  24.771*  1.639  24.392*  17.328  23.688*  17.794 
  (14.509)  (18.884)  (13.008)  (21.127)  (13.130)  (20.893)  (13.966)  (10.804)  (14.376)  (10.915) 
Countries  114  141  114  141  114  141  106  130  104  129 
Instruments  33  33  34  34  35  35  36  36  37  37 
AR(2) test [p-value]  0.432  0.251  0.403  0.245  0.404  0.245  0.390  0.389  0.480  0.468 
Hansen J [p-value]  0.858  0.727  0.866  0.730  0.865  0.727  0.910  0.751  0.914  0.684 
Observations  2,118  2,559  2,118  2,559  1,985  2,381  1,983  2,379  1,946  2,338 
Notes: GMM specifications include year effects and use lag 2 of the endogenous variables with collapsed instrument matrix.  Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 12: The impact of Institutional Quality, Conflicts and Resources on the Volatility of Public Investment/Total Investment 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Lag dependent  0.267***  0.219***  0.268***  0.221***  0.267***  0.221***  0.293***  0.243***  0.292***  0.248*** 
   variable  (0.053)  (0.054)  (0.053)  (0.054)  (0.053)  (0.055)  (0.049)  (0.055)  (0.049)  (0.054) 
Quality of  -0.544***    -0.530***    -0.530***    -0.533***    -0.430***   
   Governance  (0.141)    (0.147)    (0.147)    (0.137)    (0.146)   
Checks and    -0.897**    -0.808**    -0.810**    -0.724**    -0.460 
   Balances    (0.357)    (0.355)    (0.356)    (0.362)    (0.352) 
Population  -1.181**  -0.989**  -1.152**  -0.863*  -1.151**  -0.868*  -0.988**  -0.855**  -0.943**  -0.966*** 
   (log)  (0.477)  (0.477)  (0.456)  (0.463)  (0.457)  (0.461)  (0.426)  (0.408)  (0.412)  (0.369) 
Leftist Party  1.167  0.703  1.112  0.606  1.110  0.632  0.378  0.162  0.355  0.104 
  (1.169)  (1.338)  (1.133)  (1.312)  (1.129)  (1.306)  (1.025)  (1.253)  (1.005)  (1.127) 
Price of Investment  -0.028  -0.049*  -0.028  -0.046*  -0.028  -0.046*  -0.024  -0.044  -0.026  -0.040 
  (0.021)  (0.028)  (0.021)  (0.027)  (0.021)  (0.027)  (0.020)  (0.029)  (0.024)  (0.031) 
GDP per capita  -0.135  -0.164  -0.139  -0.167  -0.139  -0.166  -0.137  -0.170  -0.120  -0.165 
  (0.157)  (0.138)  (0.157)  (0.137)  (0.157)  (0.137)  (0.172)  (0.156)  (0.177)  (0.161) 
Conflicts  -1.921  1.006  -1.907  0.908  -1.909  0.927  -2.943  0.008  -2.632  -0.138 
  (2.639)  (2.561)  (2.647)  (2.573)  (2.647)  (2.577)  (2.685)  (2.613)  (2.765)  (2.678) 
ODA      0.029  0.110*  0.030  0.103*  0.020  0.103  0.062  0.158** 
      (0.068)  (0.058)  (0.072)  (0.061)  (0.072)  (0.065)  (0.085)  (0.071) 
HIPC          0.027  1.050  0.432  1.300  1.186  1.379 
          (1.630)  (1.840)  (1.628)  (1.836)  (1.649)  (1.761) 
Revenues              -0.005  -0.075  -0.078  -0.154** 
              (0.053)  (0.058)  (0.055)  (0.061) 
Rents                  0.195***  0.304*** 
                  (0.073)  (0.080) 
Constant  38.208***  31.801***  37.455***  28.884***  37.427***  28.896***  34.398***  29.981***  31.787***  30.076*** 
  (7.328)  (7.853)  (6.988)  (7.718)  (7.026)  (7.712)  (6.618)  (6.822)  (6.879)  (6.546) 
Countries  114  139  114  139  114  139  106  129  104  128 
Instruments  51  51  52  52  53  53  54  54  55  55 
AR(2) test [p-value]  0.267  0.325  0.268  0.327  0.268  0.325  0.775  0.726  0.766  0.703 
Hansen J [p-value]  0.129  0.501  0.129  0.506  0.131  0.490  0.213  0.759  0.282  0.662 
Observations  2,150  2,569  2,150  2,569  2,150  2,569  1,994  2,377  1,955  2,334 
Notes: GMM specifications include year effects and use lags 1 to 7 of the endogenous variables with collapsed instrument matrix.  Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 39 
 
Table 13: The impact of the subcomponents of Quality of Governance on the 
Volatility of Public Investment 
 
Public Investment 
/ GDP    
Public Investment / 
Total Investment 
   (1)  (2)    (3)  (4) 
Lag dependent  0.689**  0.667**    0.296***  0.295*** 
   variable  (0.313)  (0.320)    (0.049)  (0.048) 
Bureaucracy  -0.014  -0.055    -0.574**  -0.675** 
   Quality  (0.562)  (0.594)    (0.288)  (0.287) 
Corruption  -0.165  -0.010    -0.317  -0.415 
  (0.637)  (0.651)    (0.414)  (0.460) 
Law and Order  -1.076*  -0.879    -0.521  -0.515 
  (0.579)  (0.567)    (0.369)  (0.361) 
Government    -1.787      -0.008 
   Stability    (1.264)      (0.345) 
Democratic    -0.003      0.317 
   Accountability    (0.372)      (0.342) 
Countries  106  106    106  106 
Instruments  39  41    57  59 
AR(2) test [p-value]  0.271  0.355    0.725  0.721 
Hansen J [p-value]  0.564  0.597    0.225  0.220 
Observations  1,983  1,983     1,992  1,992 
Notes: GMM specifications include year effects and use lag 1 in column (1) and 
(2) and lag 2 from column (3) and (4) of the endogenous variables with 
collapsed instrument matrix. Population (log), GDP per capita, Conflicts, ODA, 
HIPC, Revenues, Oil Exports and the constant term are included in all the 
regressions. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** 




Table 14: The impact of Institutional Quality on the Quality of Infrastructure (Paved Roads/Total Roads) 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Lag dependent  0.945***  0.926***  0.928***  0.918***  0.926***  0.923***  0.908***  0.896***  0.884***  0.892*** 
   variable  (0.066)  (0.067)  (0.081)  (0.068)  (0.082)  (0.064)  (0.095)  (0.087)  (0.119)  (0.087) 
Quality of  0.166    0.179    0.182    0.199    0.219   
   Governance  (0.175)    (0.178)    (0.179)    (0.182)    (0.196)   
Checks and    0.225    0.127    0.125    0.222    0.162 
   Balances    (0.210)    (0.144)    (0.140)    (0.211)    (0.173) 
Population  0.134  0.080  0.111  -0.038  0.114  -0.024  0.228  0.170  0.271  0.180 
   (log)  (0.161)  (0.128)  (0.158)  (0.140)  (0.160)  (0.130)  (0.305)  (0.224)  (0.368)  (0.233) 
Leftist Party  -0.000  0.278  0.129  0.363  0.125  0.348  0.221  0.299  0.254  0.310 
  (0.291)  (0.486)  (0.403)  (0.515)  (0.402)  (0.496)  (0.426)  (0.480)  (0.496)  (0.477) 
Price of Investment  -0.001  0.002  -0.001  0.002  -0.001  0.001  -0.001  0.003  -0.002  -0.000 
  (0.004)  (0.007)  (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.008)  (0.004)  (0.006) 
GDP per capita  0.004  0.019  0.003  0.034  0.001  0.031  -0.002  0.031  -0.002  0.033 
  (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.020)  (0.025)  (0.019)  (0.024)  (0.019)  (0.024)  (0.021)  (0.025) 
Conflicts  0.045  -0.809  -0.026  -0.737  -0.063  -0.686  -0.242  -1.023  -0.112  -0.743 
  (0.513)  (0.997)  (0.607)  (0.924)  (0.622)  (0.885)  (0.728)  (1.148)  (0.754)  (0.889) 
ODA      -0.070  -0.123  -0.063  -0.109  -0.074  -0.122  -0.113  -0.143 
      (0.078)  (0.099)  (0.073)  (0.088)  (0.079)  (0.102)  (0.122)  (0.116) 
HIPC          -1.415  -1.584  -1.789  -2.057  -2.226  -2.227 
          (1.177)  (1.183)  (1.389)  (1.531)  (1.841)  (1.600) 
Revenues              0.028  0.072  0.057  0.088 
              (0.051)  (0.073)  (0.087)  (0.085) 
Rents                  -0.052  -0.082 
                  (0.072)  (0.078) 
Constant  -2.747  1.677  -1.300  4.542  -1.260  4.088  -2.908  0.601  -2.725  0.972 
   (2.640)  (3.055)  (2.291)  (4.715)  (2.300)  (4.334)  (4.411)  (3.438)  (4.904)  (3.624) 
Countries  127  154  126  153  126  153  118  142  118  142 
Instruments  27  27  28  28  29  29  30  30  31  31 
AR(2) test [p-value]  0.621  0.553  0.604  0.537  0.620  0.558  0.560  0.492  0.567  0.507 
Hansen J [p-value]  0.371  0.559  0.403  0.616  0.389  0.580  0.430  0.669  0.461  0.630 
Observations  1,189  1,383  1,172  1,365  1,172  1,365  1,092  1,273  1,069  1,250 
Notes: GMM specifications include year effects and use lag 1 of the endogenous variables with collapsed instrument matrix.  Robust standard errors are 




Table 15: The impact of Institutional Quality on the Quality of Infrastructure (Electric Power System Losses as a percentage of Total Power Outputs – 
rescaled) 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Lag dependent  0.737***  0.767***  0.729***  0.761***  0.731***  0.762***  0.719***  0.744***  0.708***  0.737*** 
   variable  (0.053)  (0.032)  (0.056)  (0.036)  (0.056)  (0.036)  (0.066)  (0.047)  (0.055)  (0.048) 
Quality of  0.181***    0.185***    0.183***    0.197***    0.142***   
   Governance  (0.050)    (0.054)    (0.054)    (0.061)    (0.054)   
Checks and    0.266**    0.234**    0.236**    0.281**    0.152 
   Balances    (0.122)    (0.117)    (0.117)    (0.138)    (0.128) 
Population  0.164  0.129  0.159  0.116  0.159  0.118  0.180  0.306  0.130  0.303 
   (log)  (0.134)  (0.146)  (0.140)  (0.143)  (0.139)  (0.143)  (0.157)  (0.214)  (0.155)  (0.218) 
Leftist Party  -0.432  -0.462  -0.406  -0.370  -0.405  -0.373  -0.407  -0.586  -0.370  -0.645 
  (0.415)  (0.483)  (0.439)  (0.477)  (0.437)  (0.476)  (0.499)  (0.625)  (0.434)  (0.590) 
Price of Investment  0.005  0.009**  0.005  0.009*  0.005  0.009*  0.005  0.010*  0.003  0.006 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.005) 
GDP per capita  -0.021  -0.029  -0.020  -0.028  -0.020  -0.028  -0.015  -0.021  -0.012  -0.018 
  (0.019)  (0.027)  (0.022)  (0.030)  (0.022)  (0.030)  (0.024)  (0.035)  (0.024)  (0.036) 
Conflicts  -0.137  -0.449  -0.122  -0.368  -0.132  -0.378  0.039  -0.174  0.117  0.094 
  (0.398)  (0.457)  (0.403)  (0.482)  (0.402)  (0.486)  (0.397)  (0.527)  (0.475)  (0.576) 
ODA      -0.013  -0.072*  -0.010  -0.069*  -0.007  -0.066*  -0.017  -0.075** 
      (0.026)  (0.037)  (0.027)  (0.038)  (0.032)  (0.040)  (0.027)  (0.037) 
HIPC          -0.437  -0.521  -0.649  -0.551  -0.015  0.385 
          (0.880)  (0.936)  (1.032)  (1.124)  (0.930)  (0.999) 
Revenues              0.014  0.068**  0.043*  0.092*** 
              (0.015)  (0.028)  (0.025)  (0.032) 
Rents                  -0.087  -0.095* 






















  (10.858)  (7.277)  (11.443)  (8.036)  (11.522)  (7.954)  (13.435)  (11.125)  (10.593)  (11.281) 
Countries  119  127  119  127  119  127  110  116  107  114 
Instruments  36  36  37  37  38  38  39  39  40  40 
AR(2) test [p-value]  0.498  0.457  0.501  0.442  0.500  0.442  0.522  0.413  0.504  0.442 
Hansen J [p-value]  0.296  0.316  0.365  0.211  0.357  0.222  0.229  0.176  0.278  0.337 
Observations  2,443  2,585  2,431  2,572  2,431  2,572  2,226  2,330  2,168  2,273 
Notes: GMM specifications include year effects and use lags 1 to 2 of the endogenous variables with collapsed instrument matrix.  Robust standard errors 
are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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Table 16: The impact of Institutional Quality on the Quality of Infrastructure (Faults per 100 main fixed lines per year – rescaled) 
   (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10) 
Lag dependent  0.588***  0.625***  0.589***  0.621***  0.589***  0.621***  0.593***  0.619***  0.594***  0.611*** 
   variable  (0.073)  (0.057)  (0.073)  (0.058)  (0.073)  (0.058)  (0.070)  (0.059)  (0.069)  (0.062) 
Quality of  1.240***    1.104**    1.098**    1.043**    1.158**   
   Governance  (0.424)    (0.433)    (0.433)    (0.419)    (0.501)   
Checks and    0.691    0.408    0.413    0.367    0.294 
   Balances    (0.853)    (0.834)    (0.835)    (0.888)    (0.932) 
Population  -1.547  -0.546  -1.704  -0.847  -1.671  -0.812  -1.650  0.418  -1.607  0.291 
   (log)  (1.768)  (1.334)  (1.742)  (1.393)  (1.749)  (1.404)  (1.736)  (1.336)  (1.729)  (1.308) 
Leftist Party  -2.660  -2.395  -2.243  -1.929  -2.251  -1.939  -2.211  -2.228  -2.664  -2.918 
  (2.622)  (2.534)  (2.618)  (2.411)  (2.615)  (2.411)  (2.858)  (2.492)  (2.903)  (2.559) 
Price of Investment  0.002  0.025  0.012  0.034  0.010  0.033  0.018  0.045  0.009  0.042 
  (0.066)  (0.083)  (0.064)  (0.084)  (0.063)  (0.083)  (0.062)  (0.087)  (0.070)  (0.105) 
GDP per capita  -0.048  -0.259*  0.143  -0.174  0.138  -0.175  0.073  -0.237  0.079  -0.222 
  (0.155)  (0.139)  (0.168)  (0.174)  (0.166)  (0.173)  (0.167)  (0.194)  (0.174)  (0.201) 
Conflicts  -6.589  -10.036**  -7.012  -9.667**  -7.176  -9.781**  -5.610  -7.953*  -5.621  -7.907* 
  (5.830)  (4.149)  (5.797)  (4.187)  (5.801)  (4.197)  (5.677)  (4.159)  (5.623)  (4.279) 
ODA      -0.179  -0.390***  -0.153  -0.371**  -0.134  -0.326**  -0.097  -0.358** 
      (0.138)  (0.146)  (0.141)  (0.150)  (0.157)  (0.154)  (0.155)  (0.158) 
HIPC          -3.489  -2.909  -3.338  -2.076  -3.920  -2.961 
          (4.637)  (4.159)  (4.663)  (4.242)  (5.247)  (4.662) 
Revenues              0.100  0.513**  0.059  0.549** 
              (0.128)  (0.213)  (0.124)  (0.216) 
Rents                  0.212  -0.096 






















  (119.196)  (96.383)  (119.375)  (99.195)  (119.301)  (99.095)  (114.895)  (93.885)  (111.616)  (97.887) 
Countries  119  146  118  145  118  145  112  136  110  134 
Instruments  33  33  34  34  35  35  36  36  37  37 
AR(2) test [p-value]  0.483  0.403  0.479  0.394  0.479  0.394  0.478  0.407  0.478  0.415 
Hansen J [p-value]  0.421  0.496  0.392  0.431  0.395  0.435  0.500  0.337  0.486  0.463 
Observations 
1,043  1,248  1,041  1,246  1,041  1,246  963  1,143  942  1,119 
Notes: GMM specifications include year effects and use lag 1 of the endogenous variables with collapsed instrument matrix.  Robust standard errors are in 




Table 17: The impact of the subcomponents of Quality of Governance on the Quality of Infrastructure 
 
Paved Roads/Total 
Roads   
Electric Power 
System Losses as a 
percentage of Total 
Power Outputs - 
rescaled   
Faults per 100 main 
fixed lines per year - 
rescaled 
   (1)  (2)    (3)  (4)    (5)  (6) 
Lag dependent  0.913***  0.909***    0.707***  0.706***    0.590***  0.593*** 
   variable  (0.095)  (0.098)    (0.063)  (0.063)    (0.071)  (0.070) 
Bureaucracy  0.217  0.259    0.348**  0.385**    1.463  1.688 
   Quality  (0.173)  (0.215)    (0.163)  (0.185)    (1.091)  (1.150) 
Corruption  -0.159  -0.156    -0.184  -0.144    -0.151  0.046 
  (0.157)  (0.151)    (0.179)  (0.174)    (1.243)  (1.122) 
Law and Order  0.507  0.508    0.341**  0.353**    1.768**  1.764** 
  (0.510)  (0.512)    (0.149)  (0.152)    (0.810)  (0.816) 
Government    0.185      -0.088      -0.172 
   Stability    (0.141)      (0.090)      (1.217) 
Democratic    -0.093      -0.109      -0.670 
   Accountability     (0.143)       (0.102)       (0.736) 
Countries  118  118    110  110    112  112 
Instruments  33  35    42  44    39  41 
AR(2) test [p-value]  0.615  0.658    0.515  0.521    0.479  0.477 
Hansen J [p-value]  0.403  0.427    0.236  0.240    0.544  0.505 
Observations  1,092  1,092     2,224  2,219     963  963 
Notes: GMM specifications include year effects and use lag 1 in column (1) and (2), lags 1 to 2 in column (3) and 
(4), and lag 1 in column (5) and (6) of the endogenous variables with collapsed instrument matrix. Population (log), 
GDP per capita, Conflicts, ODA, HIPC, Revenues, Oil Exports and the constant term are included in all the 
regressions. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%. 
 